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ABSTRACT. Fault-tolerance technique enables a system or application to continue
working even if some fault /error occurs in a system. Therefore, it is vital to choose
appropriate fault tolerant technique best suited to our application. In case of
real-time embedded systems in a space project, the importance of such techniques
becomes more critical. In space applications, there is minor or no possibility of
maintenance and faults occurrence may lead to serious consequences in terms of
partial or complete mission failure. This paper describes the comparison of various
fault tolerant techniques for space applications. This also suggests the suitability of
these techniques in particular scenario.  The study of fault tolerance techniques
relevant to real-time embedded systems and on-board space applications (satellites)
is given due importance. This study will not only summarize fault tolerant
techniques but also describe their strengths. The paper describes the future trends
of faults-tolerance techniques in space applications. This effort may help space
system engineers and scientists to select suitable fault-tolerance technique for their
mission.
Keywords: ALFTD; ALFT; Dependable Systems; Fault Tolerance;
Recovery Block; Space Application; SNV; Watch-dog system;
1. Introduction. On-board real-time space applications (satellites) OBC are combination of hardware and software [1].
Space environment is very hard due to severe radiation effects, therefore on-board applications hardware (RAMs) and
software are more vulnerable to soft error (transient faults) [2]. Strong space radiations can easily toggle/flip RAM bits
which lead to incorrect on-board real-time computations and invalid data storage[3]. These situations have drastic
effects on space missions. To avoid these situations experts suggest two major fault tolerance techniques for such
applications/missions namely hardware redundancy mechanism and software based fault tolerance techniques[4]. For
space applications hardware are very costly (space grade hardware), but are more reliable as compared to software
based fault tolerance techniques[5]. For low cost micro satellites, experimental satellites efforts are made to use
software fault tolerance techniques without compromising on system efficiency, functionality, performance and
reliability[6]. The focus of our effort in this research is to find out and analyze software based fault tolerance techniques
used in space applications. Advantages and disadvantages of these techniques, the future trends of these software fault
tolerance techniques to handle soft errors, which could be used in low cost space applications and experimental
applications is explored and discussed.
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2. IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS
2.1. Dependable System:
“Trustworthy enough that reliance can be placed on the service it delivers” [7]. It has features of high availability, high
reliability and also provides safe and secure operations.  Dependability can be achieved by fault avoiding at system
design time, fault removal during design implementation, and fault tolerance during system execution/ functioning [7]
[8].
Figure 1. Dependable Systems [7]
3. Software Fault-tolerance Techniques For Space Applications
There are two main levels/types of fault tolerance mechanism/techniques for space applications; hardware fault
tolerance and software fault tolerance. Hardware fault tolerance for space applications follows space grade hardware
replication and it is not in the scope of this paper. Our focus is on software fault tolerance techniques for space
applications especially satellites. Software fault tolerance mechanism is applied through software programming to
recover the on-board system from program faults, data faults, and transient faults (soft errors due to space environment).
In space applications OBC software fault tolerance design is implemented by three ways i.e. 1) implementation through
single version of OBC software programming 2) implementation through multiple versions of OBC software
programming 3) implementation through whole code uploading from ground station (in case of complete OBC software
failure).
1)Single Version programming (SVP): Single version of the satellite on-board software is used. In this programming
software fault tolerance implemented by applying exception handling, check point & restart, input data repression
mechanisms. The main technique applied is backward recovery. In backward recovery the on-board satellite software
faulty state is corrected by restoring the system to its previous correct state. The backward recovery scheme is
implemented by using recovery blocks (RcBs). Recovery block has an executive, acceptance test, primary and alternate
mechanisms/ algorithms. In embedded systems of satellites the recovery block also have watchdog timer (WDT). This
scheme is good for recovering soft errors that arises in satellites OBC software due to space environment [7][10].
2)Multi-Version programming (MVP): In this scheme of on-board satellite software programming, two or more
software versions are executed sequentially/concurrently to achieve high reliability. These versions are created using
some kind of design diversity e.g. with different design teams or algorithms. In OBC of satellites, this fault tolerance
technique is implemented using N-version programming (NVP) technique and forward errors correction mechanism is
adopted in NVP. In forward error correction mechanism different design diverse/algorithms for the same process are
executed simultaneously [7][10].
In real-time OBC of satellites NVP design have an executive, n variant (versions), and a decision mechanism (DM) and
acceptable results obtained through DM are forwarded to be used in further on-board processing. Various forms of
implementation of NVP in real-time OBC of satellites are a) all replicas on a single HW component b) NVP Replicas on
multiple HW components c) NVP adjucator on separate HW component d) NVP complete program replicas vs program
segment replicas.
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4. SOFTWARE FAULT TOLERANCE TECHNIQUES USED IN SATELLITES
In satellites high reliability is achieved by using combination of hardware and software. The satellite on-board software
design is very critical therefore it is not make public. Any space agency’s documents are highly classified therefore not
much data is available with respect to on-board software, specific to spacecraft missions. However following are the
few examples of on-board software fault tolerance techniques used in experimental/micro satellites.
4.1 WATCH-DOG SYSTEM & ACCEPTANCE TESTS FOR PANSAT:
This on-board software fault tolerance technique was used in PANSAT (an experimental satellite). The main objectives
of the satellite were to provide email, binary file transfer and radio services The OBC hardware of PANSAT consists of
two space grade Intel 80186 CPUs, one 512 Kb working RAM having hamming code for detecting and correcting single
bit errors. Hamming code can also detect two bit errors but could not correct them; however three or more bit errors
cannot be detected by this code. Two 04 MB memories for email and binary file storage data. These memories are
redundant for each other and do not have error correcting hamming code. Two 512 Kb non-volatile memories for
storing telemetry and other important data. The main on-board operating system and application software was uploaded
after the launch from ground. This code uploading mechanism provides the benefit of uploading the new enhanced
versions of on-board software which also allows error rectification in the existing on-board software and adding
additional features. Following figure shows the error classification/categories that PANSAT on-board software fault
tolerance mechanism had to handle [11].
Figure 9: PANSAT Software Fault Tolerance Error Classes [11]
N-version and recovery block scheme could not be used for handling PANSAT on-board software faults mentioned
above. Instead a strategy of watch-dog system along with acceptance tests to identify errors in each class was developed
for PANSAT on-board software fault tolerance.  Watch-dog function send query to each on-board software module
after every 10 minutes and verify their health status. If no-reply or bad-reply received watch- dog system isolate the
error and rectify it. Watch-dog function just provides remedies for the faults, occurred in the on-board software, instead
of masking faulty results [11].
For system errors complete system, operation system failure and operating system live look ground station intervention
is required to make the PANSAT on-board system fully functional, however for rest of the system errors, the system
itself has the capability to rectify them on-board. For those system errors watch-dog function restart the relevant
processes in case of errors, even if the problem not solved ground intervention is required. For program errors and data
errors firstly on-board system itself try to rectify the error by resetting the faulty process and even if the problem does
not solved the ground operator correct it by analyzing the error log file. These types of errors have least impact on the
system and system continues to perform its operations. Error in the log file is also removed from ground, by uploading
the new code.  For all types of the above mentioned errors, acceptance test is the only mechanism to confirm them as
error. Four major types of acceptance tests were designed and implemented for PANSAT on-board software fault
tolerance scheme [11].
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PANSAT ACCEPTANCE TESTS
CLASSIFICATION
Satisfaction of
Requirements
Accountability
Tests
Reasonableness
Tests
Computer
run-time Tests
Figure 10: PANSAT Software Acceptance Tests Classifications [11]
Satisfaction of requirements acceptance tests were used to confirm that all subsystems are functioning properly and
their output is according to the fixed criteria. For such types of acceptance test a predefined table for each subsystem is
maintained in non-volatile memory and when the watch-dog function query for their status, the output of each system is
verified against this table and correct/ incorrect status is communicated and rectified as explained above. In acceptance
test each procedure take data, process it and check it against the table entries, as it is not possible to check all outputs
against inputs, therefore only one or two test for each subsystem  are performed. Satisfaction of requirements tests were
used to confirm/check on-board data packetization process, on-board data compression/de-compression
process/algorithms, position determination routines, correctness of file size and names, correct entry in the log file, and
correctness of file defragmentation process. Second types of acceptance tests “Accounting tests” were used to 1) verify
version number of user services by matching the counter of user service and file system. Mismatch counter indicate the
error in user services and should be rectified. 2) To verify data packet numbers and their size, as both are fixed in the
system and variation in number and packet size is error. 3) to verify clock errors, as time stamps are placed by the system
clock on user services records, packet transmission and position checking, if the time stamps are not in proper order then
there is problem with on-board system clock [11].
To verify system results reasonable tests were used. These tests were used to verify that sensor data is within nominal
range, satellite orbit is correct, acceptable commands are being executed. Violations in all these are errors and rectified
accordingly [11].
Fourth types of acceptance test used for PANSAT on-bard software fault tolerance design were computer run-time tests.
These are basically exception handling against programming/ logic errors like division by zero, stack over flow, and stack
under flow and save the system from crashing during normal satellite operations [11].
The fault tolerance strategies adopted for PANSAT on-board software is comprehensive and cover almost every types of
errors/ anomalies that could arise due to space environment and on-board software design and data problems.
The main drawback seen in this strategy in our analysis is; it requires most of the time ground operator’s intervention
for on-board software anomaly rectification.
4.2. STEP WISE NEGOTIATING VOTING (SNV) FOR HITEN:
This on-board software fault tolerance technique was used in the engineering satellite “Hiten”. Two main objectives of
the satellite were on-board software fault tolerance mechanism verification against space environment faults and
high-efficient satellite telemetry data transfer, utilizing packet format. The commercial grade hardware (micro processor
HD68HC000, 64 Kb memory having error correcting codes) were used for the OBC of HITEN satellite.
In SNV the probability of fault free operations of each redundant variant is calculated and the outputs of the modules
having highest reliability are selected as final output of the system. This reliability of a module is determined by its
capability/efficiency of handling data during data comparison and self-checking tests. The data and self-checks are
independent.  Following figure describe the SNV mechanism [12].
Figure 11: SNV Reliability determination mechanism [12]
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In HITEN satellite the SNV on-board fault tolerance design, the variants are declared as cells. The OBC contains three
cells A,B,C. Following are the main steps of SNV algorithm.
 The results of data processing variants (cells) and self checking variants (cells) are mutually exchanged using a
proper inter-cell communication mechanism. The exchanged data is passed through adjucator for comparison
(acceptance tests).
 Reliability of data processing in each cell is calculated based on self-checking results and adjucator (mutual
exchanged) results as follows
Sr.
No.
Self Check
(Pβε)
Data Compare
(Pαε)
Reliability (Rd)
1 Good Agree 1- Pε.Pβε.Pαε
2 Error
Detected
Agree 1 - Pε.Pαε
3 Good Disagree 1 - Pε.Pβε
4 Error
Detected
Disagree -----------
Table1: SNV Reliability determination [12]
 Data from the cell having highest reliability is selected as final output of the system
 For more safety/ reliability these reliability calculations are done separately in each cell also, and both the selected
system data and this calculation are further compared in modified Voter Hardware (MV) for avoiding of selecting
wrong data.
 All the above mentioned process is explained in the following figure [12].
Figure 12: SNV On-board Software Fault Tolerance Mechanism [12]
The experiment shows the NSV on-board fault tolerance mechanism worked successfully and it detected and corrected
1-bit errors (all SEUs) occurred in various devices of OBC. This technique is derived from traditional NVP fault
tolerance mechanism. It follows on-board software variants on single hardware and provide autonomous successfully5
operations without interference from ground operators. We can conclude that this technique is comparatively better
that the PANSAT on-board fault tolerance technique.
4.3. APPLICATION LEVEL FAULT TOLERANCE AND DETECTION (ALFTD) FOR OTIS:
This on-board fault tolerance technique was used in Orbital Thermal Imaging Spectrometer (OTIS) mission of NASA.
This ALFTD is an enhanced/modified version of Application Level Fault Tolerance Technique (ALFT); which itself is
a scale down version of algorithm based fault tolerance technique. ALFT technique is implemented by developing two
procedures/ functions for various/selected important on-board application tasks. The primary routine for the task contain
full functionality. The secondary routine is a scale down version of primary routine. It is implemented through different
algorithm/ technique; however it provides acceptable results/ output in-case of primary routine fails to perform its
function. The design scheme of ALFT is described in following figure [13].
Figure 13: ALFT Software Fault Tolerance Mechanism [13]
As described above, the secondary variant/routine is a reduced version of primary function. It focuses only on important
data and estimation techniques are applied to produce near accurate acceptable results. The main problems with this
technique are a) many data errors remain undetected as implementation of all possible data checks is not possible b) the
secondary routines have to execute continuously/rigorously for effective fault tolerance [13].
The ALFTD was designed to overcome the shortcoming of ALFT. The secondary routines are executed only after the
error/fault in the data/ primary routine has been established. A well defined/reliable fault detection mechanism is
designed and implemented to detect errors in the data and system. The efficiency of the ALFTD depends on the
frequency of faults detection; less fault detection will definitely results in less execution of secondary variants.
Therefore the fault detection mechanism incorporated in the scheme give more attention in terms of its accuracy. To
make this mechanism more reliable filtering-bands concepts is introduced. If the output of primary procedure is not with
in nominal ranges, the secondary procedure is used to perform desired calculations and if the calculation results are
acceptable, only then they are used by the system otherwise both routines are considered faulty and relevant alarms are
generated. ALFTD was designed and implemented for catering two types of problems 1) the crash of main process 2)
fault in one data pixel and its propagation over the network. The probability of each pixel being faulty is Pf and the
errors due to this faulty pixel are unknown [13].
The ALFTD finds the erroneous pixel and transfer it to secondary function.  For this purpose two filters natural bound
and special locality were defined in this fault tolerance scheme to handle missing of fault detection and generation of
false problems. Handling of both these types of problems is very important for achieving good results. Both these filters
were applied standalone and combined to determine the probability Pmiss and Pf.a. The combined application of filters
gives good results [13].
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Although this scheme by using two types of above mentioned filters simultaneously give good results, however the
computational overhead increased many times.  To choose a scanning range for these filters is also a challenging task,
choosing a very small range will give more accuracy in catching errors, at the cost of more alarms and it will consume
more time to handle those alarms by using secondary variants. Choosing a large scanning range is vice versa and also
consumes more time in similar way. If a suitable range (between too large and small) is chosen intelligently very good
results in terms of high probability of catching faults and less false alarms can be achieved with  reasonable
computational overhead (cost).
Following table summarizes the three above mentioned satellites fault tolerance techniques
Table2:  On-board software fault tolerance Techniques
5. FUTURE TRENDS OF FAULT TOLERANCE TECHNIQUES FOR SPACE APPLICATION
5.1. PARTIAL SOFTWARE PROTECTION
This software fault tolerance technique is useful for static codes. In this technique only important code is protected by
writing redundant code and the code which is less important and its probability of execution is very low are left as it.
This approach reduces the size of code by avoiding the unnecessarily writing of duplication code and increases the
reliability and performance of the space applications.  The following figure shows the implementation of this fault
tolerance scheme.
S.No. Satellite On-board SFTScheme OBC HW On-board SFT Features Remarks/Issues
1 PANSAT 1) Watch-dog system
2) Acceptance Tests
3) Hamming Code
1) Two space-rated Intel 80186
central processing unit.
2) One 512 Kb volatile working
RAM having hamming code
3) Two 512 Kb non-volatile RAMS
without hamming code.
4) Two 04 MB memory banks
A satisfactory approach for catring
a variety of system, program and
data errors that occure in the
on-board system due to space
environment.
1) Not autonomous, moslty require
ground operators intervention for
errors rectifications
2) Does not provide 100% accuracy
2 HITEN 1) Stepwise
Negotiating Voting
(SNV)
2) Hamming Code
1) MPU HD68HC000
2) One 64 Kb  RAM having
hamming code
A reliable approach for rectifying
soft errors (SEUs) occurred in
various devices/hardware of OBC
due to space environment.
1) Autonomous scheme,  OBC
automatically handles some of the
issues.
2) Ground operators intervention
will be required incase of sever
environment
3) Does not provide 100% accuracy
OTIS 1) Application level
fault tolerance
detection (ALFTD)
Not Known A suitable approach for low cost
satellite missions. It is based on
primary and secondary (low
scaled) varients for handling
various types of errors occured in
space environment.
1) Although this scheme by using
two types of above mentioned
filters simultaneously give good
results, however the computational
overhead increased many times.
2) To choose a scanning range for
these filters is also a challenging task
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Figure 14: Partial software protection approach [14]
The dark code represents it is made fault tolerant and the clear code is it (not made fault tolerance). To make a code
fault tolerant the decision is made by developing control flow chat and also by selecting a probability (p) for its
execution. If the execution probability is less than p, the code is left unprotected and if it is greater than p it is made
fault tolerant by generating redundant lines of code [14].
The performance evaluation of this technique shows that it give better results in terms of enhanced reliability of the
application against various types of errors.
5.2. Model Driven Software Development (MDSD)
Another approach for developing fault tolerance applications is MDSD. In MDSD fault tolerance framework N-versions
modeling (NVM) techniques and specifically developed design patterns are utilized to make applications fault tolerant.
This technique is similar to V-version programming (NVP); however its reliability will definitely be high if the
developer succeeded to create independent models. Greater independence means greater reliability and fault tolerance.
Following are the different NVM FT frameworks [15]
Figure 15: NVM FT Framework-1 [15]
The above figure shows the NVM FT framework developed using 1-tool, 1-development model and many languages.
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Figure 16: NVM FT Framework-2 [15]
The second variant of NVM, 1- development tool, many development models, and many development languages.
Figure 17: NVM FT Framework-3 [15]
The third variant of NVM, many development tool, many development models, and many development languages.
This technique seems very useful, however it is still in experimental stages and will require a lot of time achieve certain
maturity level. The questions regarding its development cost and levels of independence at various levels and in
different variants achieved for reliability are still to be answered.
The other potential candidate approaches that can be used for on-board software fault tolerance of satellite are “FTOS:
Model-Driven Development of Fault-Tolerant Automation Systems ” [17], “SES-based Framework for Fault-tolerant
Systems [18]”, “System Level Hardening by Computing with Matrices [19]”
6. Conclusion. Life of space applications (satellites) varies from few days to many years (up to 15 years). Therefore,
depending upon satellite mission requirements and recourse availability, a proper comprehensive, efficient, high
performance software fault tolerance scheme can be chosen /designed. It is also essential because once the mission is
launched there are minimal chances of correction or maintainance. In case of OBC software error, only proper fault
tolerance technique can help to avoid failure. To make the low cost satellite missions successful by using less
expensive, commercial grade OBC hardware, a comprehensive on-board software fault tolerance technique must be
designed and implemented to handle various types of errors caused by space environment. Hybrid on-board satellite
software fault tolerance approaches (combination of H/W and S/W and combination of various S/W fault tolerance
schemes) will produce better results.
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